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Hobbes surely spent the ten years (1641–1651) of greatest significance for his philosoph-
ical career on the Continent, in France, above all, in Paris. It was during this period that 
he published De cive; wrote the De motu, loco et tempore; produced a draft of the entire 
Leviathan as well as most of De corpore. His complicated relationship with Descartes 
has been studied closely, and Mersenne’s role has become clearer. There remains how-
ever the task of more carefully delineating the contours of Hobbes’s relations with the 
circles of “learned libertinism.” The Libertinism which will be dealt with here was not 
only French, instead of English, but also “theoretical” and “intellectual” rather than 
practical, and nothing at all sexual, contrary to the common usage of that word in the 
current language. French Libertinism was a philosophical trend aimed at promoting a 
non-conformist approach to religion, history, morals, and even politics.
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1 The Continental Hobbes and Libertine Circles in France
Hobbes surely spent the ten years (1641–1651) of greatest significance for his 
philosophical career on the Continent: in France and, above all, in Paris. It was 
during this period that he published De cive; wrote the De motu, loco et tem-
pore; produced a draft of the entire Leviathan as well as most of De corpore, 
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1 On this subject, see my recent edition of this text in Italian, Thomas Hobbes, “Introduction,” 
Moto, luogo e tempo, ed. by Gianni Paganini, “Classici della filosofia” series, (Turin: 
Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 2010), pp. 9–126.
2 On the Hobbes-Gassendi relationship, see the following studies of the present author: 
“Hobbes, Gassendi et la psicologia del meccanicismo,” Hobbes oggi, ed. by G. Canziani and 
A. Napoli (Milan: Franco Angeli Editore, 1990), pp. 351–446; “Hobbes, Gassendi and De cive,” 
in Materia actuosa. Antiquité, Âge classique, Lumières. Mélanges en l’honneur d’Olivier Bloch, 
ed. by Miguel Benitez, Antony McKenna, Gianni Paganini and Jean Salem (Paris: Honoré 
Champion, 2000), pp. 183–206; “Hobbes, Gassendi and the Tradition of Political Epicurean-
ism,” Der Garten und die Moderne. Epikureische Moral und Politik vom Humanismus bis zur 
Aufklärung, ed. by G. Paganini and E. Tortarolo (Stuttgart: Frommann – Holzboog, 2004), 
pp. 113–137; “Le néant et le vide. Les parcours croisés de Gassendi et Hobbes,” Gassendi et la 
Modernité, ed. by S. Taussig (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), pp. 177–214; “Hobbes, Gassendi und 
die Hypothese der Weltvernichtung,” Konstellationsforschung, ed. by M. Mulsow and M. 
Stamm (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,  2005), pp. 258–339; “Il piacere dell’amicizia. Hobbes, 
Gassendi e il circolo neo-epicureo dell’Accademia di Montmor,” Philosophie der Lust. Studien 
zum Hedonismus, ed. by M. Erler and W. Rother (Basel: Schwabe, 2012), pp. 239–258; “Early 
Modern Epicureanism: Gassendi and Hobbes in dialogue on Psychology, Ethics, and Politics,” 
in Oxford Handbook on Ancient and Modern Epicureanism, ed. by Phillip Mitsis, Oxford Uni-
versity Press (forthcoming).
3 We refer to the nowadays “classical” notion of libertinage érudit made canonical through 
the work of René Pintard (first publication 1943; new edition 1983). Over the last seventy 
years much research has been done on the French Libertines. See at least: the special issue 
in addition to polemicizing with Bishop Bramhall. Nonetheless, we habitually 
consider him first as a great political thinker situated mostly and essentially 
in the context of English debates. Yet, even if these debates had an undoubted 
impact on the evolution of his thought, one must never forget that, during this 
period, he viewed them from a Continental vantage point, owing to the fact 
that he was deeply immersed in the philosophical and scientific culture of the 
Continent.
Within this Continental context, some very imposing figures have already 
emerged from the shadows. First and foremost, Hobbes’s relationship with 
Descartes has been studied closely, and Mersenne’s role has become clearer 
with the publication of the De motu, loco et tempore, a work which benefitted 
from the careful revisions of the Minim friar, who inserted extracts of it into his 
own works.1 Galileo’s importance and, more recently, that of Gassendi are now 
fully recognized. The latter in particular has been the subject of several studies 
that have highlighted his intellectual interactions with Hobbes on a wide range 
of issues, including natural law theory and politics; psychology and morality; 
the doctrine of matter and space, and the hypothesis of world annihilation.2 
There remains however the task of more carefully delineating the contours of 
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 of “Dix-septième siècle” on Littérature, libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, 37 (1985); 
Tullio Gregory, Gianni Paganini, Guido Canziani et al., Ricerche su letteratura libertina e let-
teratura clandestina nel Seicento (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1981); Isabelle Moreau, Guérir 
du sot: les strategies d’écriture des libertins à l’âge classique (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2007). 
Considerable critical reflection on the category of French libertinism and its use has been 
done since Pintard’s times, above all by Jean-Pierre Cavaillé; we refer here to his many con-
tributions, including especially: Dis/simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le 
Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto, Religion, morale et politique au xviie 
siècle (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2002); “Les libertins: L’envers du Grand siècle,” Cahiers du 
Centre de Recherches Historiques, no. 28–29, April 2002, pp. 11–38 (reprinted in Libertinage et 
philosophie au XVIIe siècle, 7 (2003), pp. 291–319; “Libertinage, Irréligion, Incroyance, Athé-
isme dans l’Europe de la première Modernité (XVIe–XVIIe siècles) Une approche critique des 
tendances actuelles de la recherche (1998–2002),” available online 2/10/2017, at: http://www 
.dossiersgrihl.revues.org/279. For a recent summary of interpretations, see Libertin! – Usage 
d’une invective aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, ed. by Thomas Berns, Anne Staquet and Monique 
Weis, (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2013) and the most recent collection: Philosophy and Free 
Thought / Philosophy and Free-Thought, 17th-18th centuries, ed. by L. Bianchi, N. Gengoux and 
G. Paganini (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2017).
4 See Noel Malcolm, “Hobbes and Sexual Desire”, Hobbes Studies, 28 (2015) 77–102. For a more 
emphasis on the theoretical side of Restoration freethinking, in which the author tries to 
frame also some aspects of Hobbes’s thought and heritage, see Sarah Ellenzweig, The Fringes 
of Belief. English Literature, Ancient Heresy, and the Politics of Freethinking, 1660–1760 (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press 2008), esp. pp. 1–28.
Hobbes’s relations with the circles of libertinage érudit (“learned libertinism”),3 
in France. Hobbes has long been associated with the sexual Libertinism of the 
Restoration period,4 but, as Noel Malcolm has recently demonstrated, it is pos-
sible to attribute to him a non-libertine theory of how sexual behavior is modi-
fied by laws of civil society. The Libertinism which will be dealt with here was 
French, instead of English, and also “philosophical” and “intellectual” rather 
than practical, and nothing at all sexual, contrary to the common usage of that 
word in the current language. French Libertinism was in the seventeenth cen-
tury a philosophical trend aimed at promoting a non-conformist approach to 
religion, history, morals, and even politics. To this end, figures like Gabriel Nau-
dé, François La Mothe Le Vayer and Samuel Sorbière among others promoted 
a fresh reading of ancient and modern sources (respectively Machiavelli and 
Aristotelianism, skepticism, and Epicureanism) to uncover an authoritative 
tradition of freethinking opposed to Scholasticism and the more common 
theological and philosophical theses.
At issue first and foremost is the question of personal contact. Hobbes “cer-
tainly counted among his friends four members of the Académie Dupuy or 
Académie Putéane, later known as the Cabinet Dupuy; these were Mersenne, 
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5 See Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 397. La 
Mothe is mentioned to Hobbes by Charles du Bosc as one of his four or five “good friends” 
(Thomas Hobbes, Correspondence, ed. by Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994: let-
ter 137, 5/15 September 1659, vol. i), p, 504.
6 See René Pintard, Le libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle, new edition 
(Geneva: Slatine, 1983), pp. 94–97.
7 See Pintard, op. cit., pp. 403–404.
8 See Hobbes, The Correspondence, op. cit, vol. i, pp. 491–493.
Gassendi, Sorbière and La Mothe Le Vayer.”5 Naudé also belonged to this fa-
mous circle, which was the point of contact for those who went by the name 
of “Libertines,” according to the classic study of René Pintard. Moreover, all the 
distinguished foreigners who arrived in Paris in those years passed through 
it: Grotius, Campanella, the young Nicolas Heinsius in addition to Hobbes.6 
Meetings of this group of scholars, philosophers, savants and polymaths took 
place from 1617 to 1645, but in many cases the ties established here lasted well 
beyond that date.
Another significant Parisian scholarly society was the academy gathered 
around Henri-Louis Habert de Montmor, which included, among others, sever-
al friends and correspondents of Hobbes: first of all Gassendi, who returned to 
Paris in 1653 only to die there two years later; then François du Prat, Thomas de 
Martel, Samuel Sorbière and François de La Mothe Le Vayer.7 At a certain point 
following Gassendi’s death, to Sorbière fell the task of formalizing the activity 
of this group by writing the rules for its meetings, which were to be dedicated 
above all to “questions concerning nature or experiments or fine inventions.”
Although “beyond the seas,” as Hobbes said – that is, back in England – 
after 1651, Hobbes would keep in touch with the group’s activities by way of 
letters sent by the same Sorbière; he thus remained intellectually attached 
to the group’s affairs, where the spirit of Mersenne and Gassendi dominated 
even after their deaths. We possess the memorable letter of February 1, 1658, 
written by Sorbière to communicate to Hobbes the rules of the academy. Its 
author refers to the ideal of a true republic of the learned, which should be 
 non-dogmatic, open to various methods and to free discussion without any 
prejudice either of philosophy or of religion. To this enterprise, Sorbière sum-
moned in his mind exemplary figures who in his eyes represented the best in 
the scientific research of the moderns; Gilbert, Bacon, Harvey, Sarpi, Galilei, 
Mersenne, Descartes and Gassendi are all mentioned with the declared hope 
that “this century of iron will not last forever” and that “the sciences will again 
resume their place,” together with the “rejuvenated arts.”8
 129Hobbes, the “Natural Seeds”
hobbes studies 32 (2019) 125-158
<UN>
9 Sorbière to Hobbes, letter #114, 23 January/2 February 1657 (Hobbes, The Correspondence, 
op. cit., vol. i, pp. 433–435); Hobbes to Sorbière, letter #117, 6/16 February 1657 (Hobbes, 
The Correspondence, vol. i, pp. 442–444).
This eloquent letter is surely our best documentary witness to an intellectu-
al atmosphere in which different traditions and cultures converged, including 
the “libertine” milieu to which several members of the new academy belonged, 
especially La Mothe and Sorbière. Galilean science was explicitly evoked, as 
was the empiricist and experimental tradition characteristic of the two de-
ceased tutelary geniuses whom Sorbière recalls with regret, Gassendi and 
Mersenne. It should be noted that the former always maintained friendly rela-
tions with the “libertines” of his time, while the second, though he had fought 
with them in an early period of his life, kept in regular contact with certain of 
them. There was thus a constant and thorough dialogue on both sides (Hobbes 
and some “libertines”), as is otherwise attested to by the earlier exchange con-
cerning atoms and the void, the Epicurean problem par excellence. The letters 
between Sorbière and Hobbes that relate the exchange provide explicit evi-
dence that the debate involved not only those two persons but also the other 
members of the circle: Martel, du Bosc and La Mothe Le Vayer, whom both 
correspondents mentioned and of whom Hobbes says: “I very highly respect 
them” (“quos omnes summe colo”).9
The numerous letters of Hobbes which passed after 1651 between him, the 
circle of Montmor and such figures close to the libertines as Abraham du Prat, 
François du Verdus and the aforementioned Sorbière suggest that these rela-
tions must have been as close also in the preceding decade, when Hobbes did 
not need to write letters to the members of this circle because he was on the 
Continent and in touch with them, most often in Paris. All of the external signs, 
such as friendships and correspondences, as well as internal signs, like textual 
analysis of his works, allow us then to explore the trail of the possible impact 
of the debates which typified intellectual French libertinism on the evolution 
of Hobbes’s thought. This impact, if it took place (as we shall try to show), must 
have concerned first the work that was the direct result of Hobbes’s Continen-
tal sojourn, namely, Leviathan.
One must acknowledge that the record of the very few studies already car-
ried out on this “libertine” side of Hobbes’s experience in France is so far rather 
meager. Quentin Skinner was a pioneer with his article on “the disciples of 
Hobbes in France and England.” However, he focused mainly on Hobbes’s in-
fluence downstream, so to speak, and did not deal in depth with a possible 
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10 See Quentin Skinner, “Hobbes and His Disciples in France and England,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 8 (1966), pp. 153–167 (in the same author’s collected essays, 
Visions of Politics, vol. iii, Hobbes and Civil Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 308–323).
11 See Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 457–545. On the context of Hobbes’s Parisian sojourn, see, above 
all, pp. 459ff. Most of the chapter concerns the reception of Hobbes’s work; see op. cit., 
p. 541.
12 See Malcolm, op. cit., p. 540.
13 See Malcolm, op. cit., p. 545. See also Malcolm’s Introduction in his edition of Leviathan 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012).
14 See Gilbert Boss, “La doctrine libertine de Hobbes,” Hobbes Studies 16 (2003), pp. 15–40. 
Hobbes is enlisted ex officio in this “libertinism” in a very broad sense, which has little 
upstream libertine impact on him.10 The other important study for our sub-
ject, that of Noel Malcolm on “Hobbes and the European Republic of Letters,” 
directly addressed the intellectual relations between Hobbes and the French 
milieu. His conclusion, however, was rather restrictive. While acknowledging 
the existence of “some important general similarities” between certain aspects 
of Hobbesian thought and the Parisian ideology of the republic of letters, rep-
resented by a proto-libertine like Charron and libertines like Naudé and La 
Mothe Le Vayer,11 Malcolm emphasized much more the divergences than the 
affinities between Hobbes and the libertines. According to him, there would 
have been too deep a divide between “an ideology that was above all negative, 
an ideology of non-politics” as he defined the position of Libertines,12 on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the Hobbesian project, which involved “a positive 
program of political education,” a veritable “cultural transformation,” closer to 
the Enlightenment than to the libertine critique.13 The hypothesis of a positive 
contribution of libertine thought to the formation or evolution of the English 
philosopher is not really taken into account in his otherwise very remarkable 
study of the “Continental” environment where the thought of Hobbes ma-
tured. As we shall see, this “cleavage” exists and is to be noted (on this Mal-
colm’s study is absolutely right), though this fact would not, however, preclude 
Hobbes from having been able to benefit in other aspects from knowledge of 
libertine ideas, especially as regards the study of religion in general and above 
all its relations with politics.
At the opposite extreme, Gilbert Boss has described the teaching of Hobbes 
directly as “libertine.” His article (“The Libertine Doctrine of Hobbes”) is, 
however, more an overall interpretation of Hobbesian philosophy than a fo-
cused historical investigation of relations with the French “libertine” milieu 
in the proper sense of the word. Moreover, his definition of “libertinism” is too 
vague and general to be relevant in the case of Hobbes.14 Whether favorable or 
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 historical relevance in the light of research that has been done in these last decades. To 
quote: “We have assumed that Hobbes, like the philosophers of his time who were con-
cerned with morality and politics, must be a Libertine in the sense that he must defend 
the freedom to think, notably by criticizing religious and scholastic authorities.” In the 
whole article, there is no reference to the Libertines in the “historical” sense of this word; 
neither La Mothe nor Naudé nor Gassendi is mentioned. On the other hand, on p. 32, even 
Hobbes’s Christ is described as “libertine,” which is not correct (see here below, pp. 33–34).
unfavorable to any rapprochement between Hobbes and the Libertines, these 
general frameworks run the risk of obscuring the effective historical research 
which must proceed in detail and by means of the analysis of the texts when-
ever that it is possible. This “fieldwork” remains largely undone. We are speak-
ing here of the contextualization of Hobbes’s work at the micro level, always 
keeping in mind the fact too often neglected that, for a whole series of his texts 
(De cive, first and second editions; De motu, loco et tempore, and Leviathan), the 
immediate context was more Continental than insular.
What we will present here is the result of a survey that, for want of 
explicit statements by Hobbes, can be based only on two categories of objec-
tive elements:
(a) the circumstances of Hobbes’s stay in Paris, that is, the links which he was 
able to establish with the libertine circles whose general characteristics 
we have given above, and
(b) the analysis of certain parts of the Hobbesian works and such changes in 
them as can be related to the great libertine debates of the time he stayed 
in France.
Two things are evident: that the main subject of this possible, indeed, as we 
shall show, probable dialogue with the French “Libertines” of his time must 
have been religion and that the text to be investigated first is Leviathan. In-
deed, this work in particular requires consideration not only in relation to the 
English context but also as a reaction to the exceptionally heterodox ideas 
developed by the “Libertines” on the Continent regarding religion and its 
relationship with politics. Obviously, the conclusion will not be that Hobbes 
became “libertine” during his Parisian stay, which is not true, but that he took 
into account certain ideas current in French Libertinism and to some extent 
was affected by them. The relationship must be understood here in a twofold 
sense, both positive and negative, receptive and reactive: Hobbes took on cer-
tain libertine ideas, which helped him to look at religion from a broader per-
spective, and at the same time he reacted to some others in order better to 
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15 See Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. by Ferdinand Tönnies 
(London: Simpkin, Marshall and Company, 1889), i, xi, pp. 53–60.
distinguish their teaching from his own. In both cases, it was not a question 
of pure and simple reception but of stimulation, which demanded of him an 
original working through new material.
2 The Theory of Religion before Leviathan
In the analysis of religion, the Elements of Law and the De cive had played out 
on two parallel registers: the philosophical theory of religion on one hand and 
the biblical position on the other. As regards the first, the most clearly philo-
sophical, the introduction of the religious theme in these works follows paths 
that are fairly simple and uniform. It is true that even in these writings the 
knowledge of God is not without problems, the main one being that there is 
no idea of  its proper object; divinity remains inconceivable, like spirits and the 
other substances held to be incorporeal. The only proposition that can be af-
firmed of God – says Hobbes – is that He exists. Yet, even this inconceivability 
does not prevent one from being able, by means of philosophy alone, to assert 
His existence as first cause or prime mover of the universe. Yet, beyond this 
elementary rational core, there are only either the honorific uses of language 
or recourse to positive or biblical theology. Thus, Chapter xi of Part i of The 
Elements focuses on the problem of the knowledge of God and the question 
of the nature of spirits in the light of reason alone. Here, Hobbes offers igno-
rance of their true cause as the explanation of the error typical of the pagans, 
namely, belief in the incorporeality of spirits, specters, ghosts and other similar 
apparitions.15 In Part ii of the same work, Hobbes tries to show that obedience 
to the sovereign is no less conformable to reason than it is to faith, and to this 
end he cites biblical passages in the attempt to give a correct interpretation 
of them (Chapter vi). In the next chapter (Chapter vii), Hobbes develops his 
own ecclesiology, with specific regard to the relationship between religious 
and civil magistrates, and again the substance of his considerations derives 
mainly from biblical sources in that what is at issue is the study of the good 
functioning not of any state whatsoever but of the Christian state. All in all, in 
The Elements, Hobbes is quite far from developing, indeed, has no interest at all 
in, a general theory of religion that could include both natural religion as well 
as the religion of the Gentiles; his interpretation concentrates either on prop-
erly philosophical contents or on biblical features of religious experience. The 
existence of a source that is both natural and derived from the passions as well 
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16 See Thomas Hobbes, De cive The Latin Version ed. by Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1983), iii, xv, pp. 219–233. In this chapter, Hobbes takes up above all the 
problem of “the purely rational worship of God” (§ 18) “the laws concerning divine wor-
ship” (§ 16). It is thus worship more than religion in general that is considered within the 
framework of that which reason requires.
17 See Hobbes, De cive, iii, xvi, 1, pp. 234–235.
as prior both to reason and to revelation is not taken into account in The Ele-
ments, and this is why the author evinces no interest in constructing a theory 
of religion in general that might be capable of understanding the variety of 
religious phenomena in their widest extent.
The framework does not change decisively in the third part of De cive, which 
is entitled “Religio.” This whole part is built entirely on biblical sources, taken 
from the Old and New Testaments, with the exception of the initial chapter, 
which deals with the “kingdom of God by nature,” and is therefore based on His 
“rational word.” In reality, the chapter is tightly structured by its use of purely 
legal, let us say abstract, concepts that are devoid of any historical, psychologi-
cal or anthropological description of religious phenomena. Hobbes focuses on 
legal relations and mainly on the laws of worship, which are established be-
tween man and God in the regime of the “natural kingdom,” without dwelling 
on the figures that a religion that is not revealed must take in this initial state 
of human history. No significant reference is made to the diverse universe of 
non-biblical religions.16
Paradoxically, a very brief sketch of what this “natural” religion might be is 
found out of place, just at the beginning of the next chapter, which is dedicated 
to the “kingdom of God through the old pact.” In the first section, Hobbes de-
scribes the religious state of humanity before Abraham and notes that, after an 
initial phase of wonder at the events of nature, together with their knowledge of 
their own weakness, from which flows belief in the existence of a god, human-
ity rather oscillated between the two extremes of atheism and superstition, very 
soon degenerating into idolatry, true and proper. Superstition is characterized 
by “fear without right reason;” through the imperfect use of reason and the vio-
lence of the passions, it tends to divinize first “invisible things” and then directly 
“idols.”17 One finds here a very brief mention of what in Leviathan will be devel-
oped into a true and authentic natural history of religion”, but the exposition is 
so elliptical as to be of little significance. Rational knowledge, ignorance of the 
true causes, psychological factors, principally fear, are just barely announced 
and in rapid succession, as the main pieces of what would later develop into a 
more complex reconstruction of the first stages of “natural religion.”
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18 See Hobbes, Leviathan, xi, ed. by Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), vol. ii, 
p. 162.
3 The Innovations of Leviathan: “Natural Religion” and  
the Passion of Curiosity
With respect to religion, one fact immediately jumps out from a reading of 
Chapter xii of Leviathan, “Of Religion:” Leviathan presents major innovations 
in relation to the works written before or at the very beginning of Hobbes’s 
Parisian stay. These include: 1) the reference to “natural religion”, a concept 
broader than the simple philosophical investigation of the first cause, on the 
one hand, and 2) the detailed analysis of the “Religion of the Gentiles,” on 
the other. As we shall see, these elements allow Hobbes to sketch a different 
portrait of religious experience and to study it both more concretely in relation 
to the analysis of human passions and more independently of the respective 
claims of truth put forward by the different positive religions.
Simply stated, the discourse on religion shifts in its relation to philosophy 
and revelation in order to situate itself at the level of the theory of human 
passions, that is, of moral psychology and anthropology. The introduction of 
this original perspective gives a new and unexpected twist to the structure of 
Chapter xii in comparison with previous works.
Let us note first that the religious theme is complicated and twofold in 
Leviathan, unlike the more uniform treatments in the preceding writings. Here, 
alongside the purely rational consideration that leads us to the demonstration 
of the first cause, Hobbes develops another genesis of religion, one that has its 
source in the passions rather than in rational factors. As he says toward the end 
of Chapter xi of Leviathan, the issue at stake is the consideration of how men 
have made their gods as “the creatures of their own fancy”, with scarce regard 
as to whether they consider them genuine or not. There is even a sort of sym-
metry which seems to put the distinction between “religion” and “superstition” 
into a single perspective, in accordance with the viewpoint of the observer and 
not according to the real nature of their respective contents.
And this Feare of things invisible is the naturall seed of that, which every 
one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that 
Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.18
This development about the “natural” origin, which does not exactly corre-
spond to either philosophical reason or biblical revelation, makes it possible 
to consider an ensemble of matters belonging to secular and profane history. 
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19 Hobbes refers to the phrase “naturalis religio” in De cive iii, xvi, 10, p. 239 to indicate that 
the second commandment of not worshipping any image “is a part of natural religion”. 
The beginning of this section makes distinctions between the Jewish laws that oblige by 
nature and those by covenant, either with Abraham or Moses. The context and even the 
meaning of the phrase “natural religion” are quite different from those of Leviathan.
20 That is, in the sense of his philosophic teaching on man, in accordance with the spirit of 
the general theme “Of Man” in the first part of Leviathan.
21 For an explication of the sense in which Leviathan contains a significant innovation on 
this point over his other works, see G. Paganini, “Passionate Thought: Reason and the 
passion of curiosity in Thomas Hobbes, Emotional Minds. The passions and the limits of 
pure inquiry in early modern philosophy, ed. by S. Ebbersmeyer (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 
2012), pp. 227–256. See also “Hobbes, Montaigne et les animaux moraux,” L’axe Montaigne-
Hobbes: Anthropologie et politique ed. by E. Ferrari et T. Gonthier (Paris : Classiques Gar-
nier), pp. 131–150.
22 See Leviathan, p. 160. On the importance of curiosity and its links to religion, see Yves 
Charles Zarka, “La curiosité chez Hobbes,” Curiosité et ‘Libido Sciendi’ de la Renaissance 
Thus, in Leviathan, Hobbes makes room for a sort of ‘neutral’ description of 
the phenomenon of religion, which bears on neither its value as philosophical 
knowledge nor its claim to divine truth. This more distanced and, at the same 
time, broader view addresses the varied experience of cults and beliefs. In this 
way, a new landscape is given form, which Hobbes designates with an expres-
sion loaded with historical significance: “natural religion,” an expression and 
concept never before at issue in The Elements and mentioned once in De cive 
only in passing.19
The motive force behind all these changes lies in a new anthropological fac-
tor,20 whose nature we can specify. Hobbes locates the defining characteris-
tic of man in the possession of a passion which is his own alone: curiosity.21 
The search for causes is not merely a rational process; it is also the effect of a 
passionate impulse, in which converge “Curiosity or love for the knowledge 
of causes” and “Anxiety for the future time”. The marginal title accomplishes 
the full fusion of these two motifs: “Curiosity to know,” says Hobbes, “from Care 
of future time”, who adds in the following title: “Naturall Religion, from 
the same.”22 With this notion, natural religion, and especially together with the 
passionate motives that produce it, namely, curiosity and anxiety, Hobbes goes 
well beyond the pure rational knowledge of the existence of God. Thanks to 
the revolution in the doctrine of man in Leviathan, its author can now venture 
into relatively unknown territory, that of psychological, emotional and politi-
cal, in short, simply human, factors, which preside over the origin and forma-
tion of religious beliefs.
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 aux Lumières ed. by Nicole Jacques-Chaquin (Paris: Presses de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure 
de Fontenay, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 157–166 ; Gianni Paganini, «Thomas Hobbes Philosopher 
of Curiosity», Curiosity and the Passions of Knowledge from Montaigne to Hobbes, ed. by 
G. Paganini (Rome : Accademia dei Lincei; Rome: Bardi Edizioni), pp. 7-36. 2018).
23 Leviathan, p. 160.
To be precise, we are far from the proto-Deist conception of Herbert of 
Cherbury, who had conceived of natural religion as a set of simple or primitive 
truths, underlying or antecedent to historical religions. For Hobbes, the phrase 
“natural religion” means rather a religion that is explained simply through the 
characteristics of human nature in its actual emotional constitution – hence 
also the importance accorded to the biological metaphor of the “seed of reli-
gion,” the “germ of religion” which, as will be seen later, consists more of non-
cognitive and clearly passionate factors than of rational inference to the first 
cause.
4 The Emotive Complex of “Natural” Religion: Curiosity, Anxiety, 
Ignorance and Imagination
Chapter xii of Leviathan presents a complex structure requiring detailed 
analysis. It is preceded in Chapter xi by a strictly philosophical definition of 
religion in line with the traditional considerations found in The Elements or 
De cive about the “first and only motor” or the “first and eternal cause of all 
things.” Man is driven “from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and 
again the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at 
last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; 
which is it men call God.”23 In this perspective, Hobbes makes the beginnings 
of religion depend on the search for causes through to the first of the series, 
a search that is driven by the characteristically human passion, “Curiosity.” In 
this sense, religion and philosophy overlap, at least partially, for both lead to a 
belief in the existence of the prime mover of the world, namely, says Hobbes, a 
primary and eternal cause of all things, which is what men mean by the name 
of God, a transparent paraphrase of the formula, with which the exposition 
of each of the five “paths” to the demonstration of the existence of God, ends 
in the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas. Strictly speaking, this is to be 
a completely disinterested knowledge; Hobbes adds that men accomplish it 
“without thought of their fortune”, even if – a few lines above – he has already 
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(Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), pp. 99–128.
25 Leviathan, p. 164.
mentioned “anxiety” as the “care of future time” that dispose men to inquire 
into the causes of things.24
However, the discourse becomes complicated as soon as the “rational” con-
siderations already present in the previous works intersect with the anthropo-
logical considerations that are typical of Leviathan. Together with the cognitive 
approach proper to rational inquiry, Hobbes reveals another kind of “anxious” 
inquiry that addresses the real or imaginary causes on which man considers 
his fate to depend. It is no longer simply a question of explaining the world 
but rather of initiating the search “for the causes of good and evill fortune.”25 
The pure philosophical theory has given way to a quest which is now driven 
by the impulse of a passion like fear, for anxiety expresses the impossibility of 
mastering a future full of unknown dangers. Disinterested curiosity becomes 
fear and anxiety under the impulse of the interest which man nurtures for his 
own future.
This passionate faculty, initiated by curiosity but immediately dominated 
by anxiety and fear, requires two other elements to be complete: ignorance and 
imagination (fancy). Indeed, Hobbes continues, this “perpetual fear,” which 
dominates expectations as to the future, is conjoined with the “ignorance” of 
real causes, that is, with the obsession with “intermediate” or “instrumental” 
causes that one can suppose but does not really know. When he is incapable of 
guessing and controlling the true causes, man imagines for himself fictitious 
causes and means of addressing them which can allay his anxiety, if only in an 
illusory way. Since, by definition, imaginary causes are not susceptible to be-
ing perceived, man identifies them easily with “powers” or “agents” invisible. 
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Ultimately, ignorance of the real causes and the apprehension produced by a 
situation of uncertainty engender – says Hobbes – the belief in the existence 
of “some Power, or Agent Invisible,” from which men expect or fear some in-
tervention that can affect their future.26 We see, then, that the same “curios-
ity” may in one case produce the philosophical knowledge of the first cause, 
and, in another, the imaginary idea of many gods; deriving from ignorance and 
imagination, there are, says Hobbes, “innumerable sorts of God,” created by 
“the innumerable variety of Fancy.”27
5 The “Religion of the Gentiles”
As a result of this, the same name of “religion” in this chapter of Leviathan 
covers at least two very different realities. There is, on the one hand, the no-
tion already encountered in The Elements or De cive, namely, a religion which 
is identified with the thesis of the existence of the first cause (even though the 
idea of God cannot be conceived) and, on the other hand, a religion which is 
explained better by the analysis of human passions, more or less perverted, 
than by the tools of pure theory or disinterested curiosity. Hobbes adds that, 
rather than in any way facilitating it, religion in this second sense represents 
a formidable obstacle to religion in the first. There is more: in the concrete 
reality of human history, setting to one side biblical revelation, the descrip-
tion of the “anxious” and “ignorant” religion ends up in the foreground at the 
expense of “cognitive” religion, that is, of the knowledge of the first cause. This 
new approach allows Hobbes to delve into the analysis of the “religion of the 
Gentiles,” giving him a good illustration of what “natural” religion really is, 
namely, the cultivation of the four “seeds” within which there need be no cor-
rect knowledge of the first and only cause.
Chapter xii of Leviathan thus accomplishes several highly important tasks:
– it describes in minute detail the genesis of human opinions about immate-
rial spirits;
– it studies in detail the origin of the worship of invisible powers;
– it analyzes belief in prognostics and shows how men have deified both the 
forces of nature as well as qualities and accidents, and
– it emphasizes the importance of awe at extraordinary events taken to be 
miracles.
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Nor does Hobbes fail to denounce the anthropomorphism by which purely 
human capacities are projected onto the divinity, such as genius, ignorance, 
concupiscence, fury, including – he adds ironically – the genital organs and 
nightly pollutions. A large part of religious belief can easily be explained by 
the divinization of animals or of natural forces, the glorification of great inven-
tors, the anthropomorphizing of the gods, feigned revelations, the exploitation 
of ignorance as to secondary causes, recourse to “second and ministerial” di-
vinities, the superstitious practice of divination, the idea of possession by the 
divine spirit (“enthusiasm”) and the fascination of sorcery, which Hobbes calls 
“juggling and confederate knavery.” With great attention to all that which con-
cerns the obsession with the future, Hobbes also draws up a small encyclope-
dia of the “superstitious ways of Divination” cultivated by the ancients, which 
includes no fewer than twelve different types of predictive techniques.28
From the strictly philosophical point of view, the demolition of this fan-
tastic world can move along quickly. Men, Hobbes explains, have assimilated 
the “invisible agents” to the human soul, believing that they are of the same 
nature as the soul and therefore similar to the nature of images that appear in 
a dream. In reality, these apparitions in no way in fact differ from the images 
reflected in mirrors or, at most, depend on “thin aërall subtle bodies,” for they 
are always material effects or realities. In this area, Hobbes puts forward the ar-
gument according to which the expressions “incorporeal substance” and “im-
material spirit” are in principle contradictory and therefore unacceptable.29
Irrationality, however, does not amount to insignificance; these beliefs, says 
the author of Leviathan, are much more widespread than one might expect 
and dominate the religious psychology of most men. That it is not only a ques-
tion of combating superstition by putting it up against principled arguments, 
like the rejection of any incorporeal spirit, is immediately understood later in 
the text of the chapter, when the author moves from the register of description 
to that of explanation. At stake is the interpretive recapitulation of the genesis 
of these beliefs and practices, and this work cannot be done on the basis of 
the simple philosophical theory of the first cause, or the equation between 
substance and body. This decisive development is also reflected in the struc-
ture of Chapter xii of Leviathan, which, after the theoretical root of religion is 
adduced – namely, curiosity in the search for causes and, above all, for the first 
cause – then shifts the discourse to the human roots of religious experience.
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30 This feature is particularly evident in the sequence of the first marginal titles: “Religion 
in Man only. First, from his desire of knowing Causes. From the consideration of the Be-
ginning of things. From his observation of the Sequell of things,” even though in the text 
Hobbes underlines the fact that in the generality of men this impulse is stronger when 
they are “curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune” (Levia-
than, p. 164).
6 “The Natural Seeds of Religion” and the Double Structure of 
Leviathan xii
As always in Hobbes, the explanation of an effect, like “natural” religion, must 
take the path of the search for causes. This means, in other words, indicat-
ing “the natural seeds of religion” and not merely opposing to them a correct 
conception of what religion should be from the philosophical point of view. 
In fact, at the moment of detailing these “causes,” the structure of Chapter xii 
takes two routes. Paragraphs 1–4 present again, in agreement with Hobbes’s 
prior texts, the theoretical and purely philosophical understanding of religion, 
taken to be the pursuit of the first cause.30 On the contrary, starting with para-
graph 5 and especially in the list of “Foure things, Natural Seeds of Religion” in 
paragraph 11, this theoretical and disinterested root (the philosophical search 
for causes) is simply omitted, so much so that the philosophical “curiosity” re-
garding the first cause does not have a place among the “four seeds.”
Is this an inconsistency or an oversight? Neither, since the general system of 
curiosity, that is, the search for causes (real or fictitious, it matters little here) 
makes possible the integration of the four “seeds” into the more general con-
sideration of human nature. Nonetheless, the divergence between the begin-
ning of the Chapter xii with its theory of the first cause and its subsequent 
development cannot be ignored or undervalued. It is as though the focus of 
Hobbes’s thinking has shifted from philosophical theory to anthropology, 
that is, the doctrine “Of Man.” Indeed, in the second and longer part of Chap-
ter xii, the major theme is no longer curiosity in general in its philosophical 
manifestation but the concrete and historical form which it takes in the reli-
gions which most people practice. Thus, as he draws up his list of the “natural 
seeds,” this time in the anthropological and psychological sense, Hobbes omits 
the search for causes, which would rightly be the main motive of belief, and 
concentrates instead on four other “seeds.” These are less theoretical but all 
the more “natural” in the sense that they are dependent upon actual human 
nature, namely, belief in ghosts, ignorance of secondary causes, devotion in 
respect of the powers that men fear, and the interpretation of fortuitous coin-
cidences as so many omens or signs. The search for the “first and only mover” 
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32 One could object that this is not a “natural seed” like the other four inasmuch as political 
association is not natural, but only artificial, according to Hobbes. In any event, the politi-
cal exploitation of religion becomes almost “natural” as soon as the Commonwealth is 
established and requires not only passive obedience, but also convinced adhesion.
has disappeared from centerstage because the “intermediate,” “instrumental” 
or downright imaginary causes have taken the place of the true cause in the 
anxious and ignorant minds of men. The note in the margin says it clearly: 
“The natural seeds of religion are in the name of four”:
And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, 
Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall for prog-
nostics, consisteth the Natural seed of Religion; which by reason of the 
different Fancies, Judgments, and Passions of several men, hath grown up 
into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are 
for the most part ridiculous to another.31
Then, an explicit and apparent contrast is drawn between what religion should 
be in theory and what it is in the reality of human beings. At this point, Hobbes 
introduces a new factor to be added to the “four seeds” which completes them, 
itself representing a fifth seed: the political or civil function of religion.32 What 
differentiates between “philosophical” religion and “popular” religions is no 
longer only the abstract content of belief (the first cause vs. the multiplic-
ity of “invisible powers”) or its motivational basis (disinterested curiosity vs. 
interested anxiety), but the purpose and also the authority by which men are 
induced to “cultivate” these “seeds.” This new distinction allows Hobbes to 
satisfy a twofold requirement: on one hand, safeguarding the special status of 
biblical religion, given that it depends on a special, divine authority, but, on 
the other, pushing even further the parallel with secular religions as they rely 
on political power, this time human and not divine, but still endowed with au-
thority. There are, Hobbes says, two different categories of men who “cultivate” 
the “natural seeds” of beliefs and cults: some do so on their own initiative and 
according to their “invention,” others by order and under the direction of God 
(“by God’s commandement, and direction”). Beyond the different authorities, 
human or divine, on whom religions are founded, there are, however, common 
bases, which allow a close comparison. The starting point is common, that is, 
the same “seeds,” but the goal is also common: to incite subjects to “obedience,” 
to cultivate “peace” and “charity,” in short, to obtain and maintain “peace in the 
state.” Of course, says Hobbes, the second category of legislators acts by divine 
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34 Ibid.
35 See Leviathan, p. 176.
36 See Leviathan, xxxvii, vol. iii, pp. 682–692.
impulse and includes Abraham, Moses and Jesus Christ, while the first, purely 
human category includes all the “founders of Common-wealths, and the law-
givers of the Gentiles.”33 In both cases, however, they are political and religious 
legislators interested in the same ends: “both sorts have done it, with a purpose 
to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, 
Peace, Charity, and civill Society.”34
While the four “seeds” all pertain to the class of spontaneous affects, they 
can also be used, or “cultivated,” as Hobbes says, to achieve political ends that 
belong to the order either of sociability, in the best case, or of manipulation, 
in the worst. Thus, in the course of Chapter xii, the author of Leviathan di-
lates several times on the action of those “legislators” who have used religion 
to govern the people better. The four-element scheme (curiosity, anxiety and 
fear, imagination and ignorance) is complemented here by a fifth element: the 
political exploitation of all of these volatile emotional motives by leaders who 
know how to act wisely in order to stabilize or strengthen their power over the 
people.
So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have 
gotten credit with them; and can with gentleness, and dexterity, take hold 
of their fear, and ignorance.35
Connecting the emotional and imaginative creation of “invisible powers,” in-
duced by fear and ignorance, with the political use of religious myths, Hobbes 
shares in the narrative that goes under the classic title of the “libertine theory 
of the political use of religions.” The typical notion of imposture (“juggling and 
confederate knavery”) is found only once in this chapter, referring to sorcerers. 
The same notion, however, will be used a good deal in the chapter on mira-
cles36 and even more in Part Four, on “the kingdom of darkness,” to describe 
the “confederacy of deceivers” that is basically the Roman church.
However, Hobbes is not inclined to generalize a conclusion that the Lib-
ertines had presented with more audacity, allowing that it could be applied 
to all religions. Quite to the contrary, the English philosopher remains very 
concerned to separate revealed religion from pagan religion. It is above all the 
“religion of the Gentiles” which gives the historical exemplification of the way 
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in which the four “seeds” plus the fifth seed of political exploitation develop 
“naturally.”
Nevertheless, the apparent decision to leave the “philosophical” definition 
of religion in the background allows Hobbes to focus on the psychological as-
pects of the phenomenon first and then its political aspects; furthermore, this 
new approach has theoretical consequences whose importance can be mea-
sured by comparison with the previous works. In this chapter of Leviathan, 
Hobbes does what he had done neither in The Elements nor in the De cive; he 
gives a general description of religions in the light of the psychological and 
anthropological, namely simply human, principles developed in the first part 
of Leviathan. The interpretative framework elaborated in Leviathan passes by 
controversial religious content in order to concentrate on a kind of objective 
phenomenology of the matter under study. Pertaining to the “Of Man” part 
of Leviathan, the point of view adopted in Chapter xii “Of Religion” seeks to 
be purely human; this is why Hobbes will disregard in this part so much of 
what is specifically Christian, the theme that will predominate in Part iii “Of 
a Christian Commonwealth,” as well as the internal controversies in Christian-
ity, which will be the subject of Part iv. What counts here is rather to see how 
religion works in the concrete reality of human nature, which is the precise 
meaning of his new expression “natural religion.”
This does not mean that his general approach is altogether neutral. Hobbes 
is quite cognizant of the distinction between religion and idolatry; everything 
in Part Four of Leviathan, dedicated to the “kingdom of darkness,” digs a chasm 
between Protestantism and Catholicism. Certain passages of his work reflect 
the reasoning of the “Independents” against the theocratic temptation of the 
Presbyterians. His method of investigating the Scriptures is indebted to the 
legacy of philology and Humanist criticism, even as he develops it well be-
yond what Valla, Erasmus and the Socinians had done. Certain aspects of his 
anthropology go back to Epicurean and neo-Epicurean doctrines, a fact that 
has far-reaching implications for the development of the religious theme, and 
so on.37 We cannot therefore say that Hobbes aims simply at neutralizing the 
political effects of religious consciousness from a purely Erastian perspective, 
though this also has its place in the work. In fact, he takes positions on several 
points of Christian doctrine with the ambition of proposing a new and more 
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Adam, then with Moses and finally in the messianic kingdom.
39 See above n. 18.
rational interpretation of essential elements of biblical religion. However, he is 
not concerned to fit himself into this or that theological current, be it orthodox 
or heterodox. His gaze is aimed much higher, at least in Chapter xii of Levia-
than: to construct a theory of religion in which Christianity or biblical religion 
is no more than a particular instance, even if it is in principle privileged by the 
fact that it possesses a special revelation.
This is why it is always difficult to locate Hobbes’s position within a defined 
religious denomination, as is shown by the fact that the discussion between 
commentators always remains inconclusive and is undoubtedly destined to 
remain so. At least in theology, Hobbes’s perspective seems to be that of the 
“bricoleur,” who takes here or there whatever best serves him, having in view a 
consistency that is no longer dictated by a desire to belong to a given confes-
sion (unless such adherence is demanded by a political exigency) but by the 
desire to safeguard and develop the critical sense of his own philosophy, even 
in that which concerns the religious theme.
Well aware that there are other levels of discourse which deal with “divine 
politics,”38 to which he returns mainly in the third part, Hobbes focuses in 
Chapter xii on religion insofar as it is “human politics,” practiced by most “law-
givers,” who remain men even when they address religious questions. The long 
description of the “religion of the Gentiles” which occupies the central part of 
the chapter has exactly this function: to show the functioning of a “natural” 
religion as an outgrowth from its “natural seeds,” without raising the question, 
at least in an explicit manner, of the special status of biblical religion. This 
detached point of view well reflects a fundamental precept which Hobbes 
derived from the sum of his reflection on history and also from his personal 
experience of religious controversy: apart from the intervention of political 
authority, which in fact more cuts the knot than unties it, religious conflict 
remains insoluble by means of theology alone in that the religion of the one 
is always the superstition of the other and vice versa, as he says at the end of 
Chapter xi.39
Said differently, the difference between “religion” and “superstition” is not 
one of differing contents, but, so to speak, of authority: the former is duly au-
thorized by power, while the latter is not. The effect of the tendency here to 
 145Hobbes, the “Natural Seeds”
hobbes studies 32 (2019) 125-158
<UN>
40 Leviathan, vi, vol. i, p. 86.
41 After Leviathan, one will find a similar point made in the Historia ecclesiastica; see the 
edition of Patricia Springborg (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008).
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relativize religion is not less than in the other definition, even if Hobbes soon 
followed up there with a mandatory reference to “True Religion:”
Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales 
publiquely allowed, RELIGION; Not allowed, SUPERSTITION.40
The distanced gaze acquired in Leviathan thus allowed the emergence of three 
objects of philosophical consideration which were not so clearly visible either 
in The Elements or De cive:
a) a philosophical description of religion in its own right, which also in-
cludes the passionate side of human nature (and it must be remembered 
that in Leviathan reason itself as a search for causes depends on a pas-
sion, namely, curiosity);
b) a detailed philosophical explanation of paganism, its origins and char-
acteristics, which had not really been taken into account in the previous 
works, and
c) a general theory of theologico-politics, including the political instrumen-
talization of religion, which goes well beyond its use in Christianity in 
the “orthodox” form of the “kingdom of God,” which had already been 
contemplated in the prior works.
7 Hobbes and French Libertine Discourse
How are we to explain these three innovations and, with that, the original dis-
cussion of the profane and pagan religions which appear in Leviathan and have 
no equivalent developments in the preceding works?41 Is this a natural evolu-
tion of Hobbes’s thought, or is it indeed necessary to think of external impulses 
that might have been able to orient or attract him in this direction? Of course, 
the fact that a treatise on “government” begins with a part “Of Man,” that is, 
with a philosophical anthropology, has a direct impact even on the treat-
ment of religion. Moreover, as we have shown elsewhere,42 this new form of 
Paganini
hobbes studies 32 (2019) 125-158
<UN>
146
43 In 1630, La Mothe Le Vayer, anonymously and with a false date and place of publication, 
published the Quatre dialogues faits à l’imitation des anciens, par Orasius Tubero. The fol-
lowing year, he published a new series of five dialogues. It is in the first series that De la di-
vinité appears; it is entitled De la diversité des religions in the other series. I have followed 
the recent edition edited by A. Pessel, entitled Dialogues faits à l’imitation des anciens 
(Paris: Fayard, 1988). For a study of the skepticism of La Mothe and of its impact on the 
thought of Descartes, see G. Paganini, Skepsis. Le débat des modernes sur le scepticisme 
(Paris: Vrin, 2008), pp. 61–100, 248–270; by the same author, “The Quarrel over Ancient 
and Modern Scepticism: Some Reflections on Descartes and His Context,” The Legacies of 
Richard Popkin ed. by Jeremy Popkin (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 173–194.
political handbook that starts with a philosophical reflection on the main fea-
tures of human nature, put its roots down in French skeptic and libertine cul-
ture, especially in Montaigne, Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer.
In the absence of substantial anticipations in The Elements or the De cive, 
the hypothesis of an entirely internal evolution in Hobbes’s thought is diffi-
cult to accept, so much the more in that the similarities to certain doctrines of 
the Libertine circles frequented by Hobbes concern not only the structure of 
the political handbook but also its contents, especially as regards the theory 
of religion. In Paris, Hobbes was able to know close up the libertine doctrines 
which La Mothe Le Vayer had elaborated, which Gassendi had discussed (with-
out being himself Libertine), which Sorbière had circulated and Mersenne 
attacked. As we have already seen, with all of these figures, Hobbes was in 
close contact during his stay in France, and he continued contact with those 
who were still alive, namely, La Mothe and Sorbière, even after he returned to 
England.
Indeed, his reading of the French Libertines has left an evident trace in his 
development signaled in the way he relates his ‘psychological’ doctrine con-
cerning the origin of religion to the ‘political’ account that he gives. If one 
looks at one of the most audacious texts of libertine culture, the dialogue on 
the subject of divinity (Dialogue sur le sujet de la divinité, 1630) of La Mothe Le 
Vayer (1588–1672),43 one sees that, in order to explain the origin and function 
of religions, La Mothe emphasizes a great variety of psychological, anthropo-
logical and moral factors that are not too far from the “seeds” identified by 
Hobbes in Leviathan.
The framework of the dialogue is more skeptical than dogmatic, which 
allowed La Mothe to present the theses of the “atheists” in a printed text, 
although without author’s name, with a fictitious date and false place of pub-
lication. The character of Orasius, who represents the skeptic, promotes in 
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44 See Leviathan, xii, pp. 172–176: “The absurde opinion of Gentilism.”
45 The French libertine explanation of religious phenomena is not reducible to the thesis 
of the imposture of religions, even if it plays a crucial role. To see the full extent of the 
treatment used to describe and demythologize religion by the libertines of the middle of 
the seventeenth century, see the anonymous text of Theophrastus redivivus (1659), ed. in 
two volumes by G. Canziani and G. Paganini (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1981–1982; now 
distributed by Franco Angeli, Milan), especially volume i, Tractatus i, ‘Concerning the 
Gods,” pp. 27–174, and volume ii, Tractatus iii, “Of religion,” pp. 341–558. For an analysis of 
this text within the framework of what we have called “radical libertinism,” see my “‘Leg-
islatores’ et ‘impostores’: Le Theophrastus redivivus et la thèse de l’imposture des religions 
au milieu du XVIIe siècle,” Sources antiques de l’irréligion moderne: le relais italien (XVe-
XVIIe siècles) ed. by D. Foucault and J. –P. Cavaillé (Toulouse: Collection de l’e.c.r.i.t., 
2001), pp. 181–218; “Qu’est-ce qu’un “libertin radical? Le Theophrastus redivivus,” Libertin ! 
Usage d’une invective aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, ed. by T. Berns, A. Staquet et M. Weis (Paris: 
Classiques Garnier, 2013), pp. 213–230; for an archeology of imposture in the modern era, 
“L’imposture des ‘leges’ dans le Theophrastus redivivus et son inscription dans l’histoire de 
l’humanité,” Figures de l’imposture. Entre philosophie, littérature et sciences, ed. by J.-C. Dar-
mon (Paris: Editions Desjonquères, pp. 29–53); “Wie aus Gesetzgebern Betrüger werden. 
Eine philosophische Archäologie des ‘radikalen’ Libertinismus,” Radikalaufklärung ed. by 
J.I. Israel and M. Mulsow (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), pp. 49–91.
46 See La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogues, pp. 330–331.
atheism less demonstrative arguments than theories about the origin of reli-
gion. Thus, he aligns the main classical theories with their sources, namely, the 
impression made by natural phenomena and the fear that derives from them, 
as in the famous primus in orbe deos fecit timor of Petronius; “the prodigious 
visions during sleep” of Epicurus, the divinization of things and useful inven-
tions in Prodicus and so forth. Many of these doctrines of “theogony” (as the 
Libertine calls them) are also found in Hobbes’s description of the origins of 
paganism.44 It may be objected that these were commonplaces among intel-
lectuals nourished on classical and Humanist sources, like Hobbes, but what 
is characteristic of libertine culture is the ability to combine classical theses 
(for example, Euhemerism, Epicureanism, anthropomorphism, utilitarianism, 
etc.) with psychological explanations based on human passions, especially fear 
and hope, and the doctrine of the political exploitation of religion by “legisla-
tors.”45 These three different aspects merge in the dialogue On Divinity, where 
a large part is dedicated to describing the action of political leaders who have 
used religion “in behalf of the moral, economic and civil life, as in explaining 
the phenomena of the customs, actions and thoughts of poor mortals, with 
the purpose of giving them certain rules of living, exempt as much as possible 
from all absurdity.”46
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47 Leviathan, xii, p. 170:
For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they 
that have nourished and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other 
have done it by God’s commandment and direction. But both sorts have done it with 
a purpose to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, 
peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort is a part of hu-
man politics; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their sub-
jects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics; and containeth precepts to 
those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort 
were all the founders of Commonwealths, and the lawgivers of the Gentiles: of the lat-
ter sort were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed Saviour, by whom have been derived 
unto us the laws of the kingdom of God.
Another French libertine author, Gabriel Naudé (1600–1653), in his Po-
litical Considerations on Coups d’état (1639) and in the Apology for Great Men 
Suspected of Magic (1625), had further developed this theme, directly applying 
the “political” paradigm to Moses and in some aspects to Jesus Christ Himself. 
As we shall see, for Hobbes, this extension was not valid, for both religious 
and political reasons. Hobbes retained the distinction between the “human 
politics” of secular legislators and the “divine politics” of Abraham, Moses and 
Jesus.47 Nevertheless, insofar as the two types of politics 1) rely on the same 
type of foundation, that is, the authority of the one who commands; 2) aim 
at the same goals, namely, peace in the state, respect for laws and the obedi-
ence of the citizens, and 3) resort to similar means, such as omens, miracles, 
prophecies, revelations, etc., it becomes possible to read them in parallel, such 
that the noun “politics” has more importance than the adjective, “human” or 
“divine,” that modifies it.
It is from this angle that Hobbes was able to profit from the reflections of the 
Libertines on the relations between religion and political authority. If we com-
pare the key passages of the theory of legislators who have used religion ac-
cording to Naudé and La Mothe Le vayer, on one hand, and the explication of 
Hobbes on “the first Founders, and Legislators of Commonwealths among the 
Gentiles,” on the other, we are struck by the similarity of analysis and, some-
times, of even the expressions used.
To this claim about the libertine origin of the thesis concerning the politi-
cal use of religion, one might object that it was already available to Hobbes in 
the writings of Machiavelli, which he certainly had known since his early col-
laboration with Francis Bacon, a great admirer of the Florentine. It is also true 
that Machiavelli was one of the sources privileged by Naudé and the French 
Libertines. Machiavelli explained repeatedly that he saw religion as being 
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48 We cite to the edition in Paris, François Targa, 1625, pp. 49–50.
49 See the edition of 1667, lacking editor and place of publication, p. 182. On Naudé, see 
two important studies: Lorenzo Bianchi, Rinascimento e libertinismo (Naples: Bibliopolis, 
1996) on the Considérations, pp. 109–142, and Anna Lisa Schino, Battaglie libertine. La vita 
e le opere di Gabriel Naudé (Florence: Le Lettere, 2014).
50 See La Mothe Le Vayer, “De la Divinité,” Dialogues, pp. 318–319.
Gabriel Naudé, Apology for All the Great Men 
Who Have Been Falsely Suspected of Magic
From this we may conjecture that all the 
finest and most cunning Legislators, not 
unaware that the best means of acquiring 
and of maintaining authority over their 
peoples was to persuade them that they 
were only the organ of some Supreme 
Deity who wished to favor them with His 
assistance and to receive them under 
His protection, made great use of these 
pretended Deities, these supposed dealings, 
these pretended apparitions, and, in a 
word, of this Magic of the ancients, better 
to disguise their ambition and found their 
empires more firmly.48
Naudé, Political Considerations on the Coups 
d’état
All the ancient legislators, desirous of 
authorizing, strengthening and laying 
down the laws which they fastened onto 
their peoples with nails, have had no better 
means at all of doing so than by publishing 
and making them believe with all possible 
industry that they had received them from 
some Divinity.49
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. xii
And therefore the first Founders, 
and Legislators of Commonwealths 
among the Gentiles, whose ends 
were only to keep the people in  
obedience, and peace, have in all 
places taken care; First, to imprint 
in their minds a beliefe, that those 
precepts which they gave concerning 
Religion, might not be thought to 
proceed from their own device, 
but from the dictates of some God, 
or other Spirit; or else that they 
themselves were of a higher nature 
than mere mortals, that their Lawes 
might the more easily be received 
[…] Secondly, they have had a care, 
to make it believed, that the same 
things were displeasing to the Gods, 
which were forbidden by the Lawes. 
Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, 
Supplications, Sacrifices, and 
Festivalls, by which they were to 
believe, the anger of the Gods might 
be appeased…50
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51 Leviathan, p. 176.
52 Leviathan, p. 178.
53 See Il Principe, vi (ed. Sergio Bertelli, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1977, pp. 30–32); xxvi, p. 102. 
Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, ibid., i, ii; i, xi; i, xix (pp. 134–35; pp. 160–63; 
pp. 183–85). On Hobbes and Machiavelli, see the ample study by Paul A. Rahe, Against 
Throne and Altar. Machiavelli and Political Theory under the English republic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, esp. pp. 249–320).
54 N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, op. cit., i, xi, pp. 161–2.
La Mothe Le Vayer, On Divinity
But all [atheists and Epicureans] agree 
amongst themselves that the greatest 
Legislators have availed themselves of 
vulgar opinion on this subject [namely, 
divinity …] for no other reason than to 
tighten the bit to the foolish people and to 
guide it with this nonsense as they liked.51
And by these, and such other 
Institutions, They obtained in 
order to their end (which was the 
peace of the Commonwealth) 
that the common people in their 
misfortunes, laying the fault 
on neglect, or errour in their 
Ceremonies, or on their own 
disobedience to the laws, were the 
less apt to mutiny against their 
Governors52
man-made, that the value of religion lies in its contribution to social order, and 
that the rules of morality must be dispensed with if security requires it. In The 
Prince and Discourses, he frequently described “armed prophets”, as he called 
them, such as Moses, Numa, Romulus, Cyrus the Great, and Theseus, as the 
greatest of the new princes, who were able to use religion as an instrument to 
engender political obedience.53 In the chapter on “Roman Religion” in particu-
lar, when dealing with the foundation of new laws and governments, he stated 
the absolute necessity of having recourse to feigned religious authorization to 
ensure the obedience of the people: “And truly there was never any order of ex-
traordinary laws for a people who did not have recourse to God, because other-
wise they would not have been accepted. For a prudent individual knows many 
goods that do not have in themselves evident reasons with which one can per-
suade others. Thus wise men who wish to take away this difficulty have recourse 
to God.” Numa is one of the preferred examples used by Machiavelli. Accord-
ing to Livy, Numa claimed that he held nightly consultations with Egeria on the 
proper manner of instituting rules and rites for the city. Machiavelli suggested 
that Numa played at religion to give himself an aura inspiring reverence and the 
appearance of the divine, in order to “establish new and uncommon orders in 
that city, doubting that his own authority would be enough to this end”.54
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55 See La Mothe Le Vayer “De la politique,” Dialogues, p. 418. On libertine political 
thought, see our chapter : “Bonheur, passions et intérêtes: l’héritage des libertins,” L’état 
It is possible that Hobbes had had direct access to Machiavelli’s reflections 
on the relations between religion and political authority, and especially to the 
theory of legislators who used religion. However, two considerations would in-
cline me to believe that there was a filtering of Machiavellian themes through 
the writings of Libertines like Naudé and La Mothe Le Vayer. Firstly, chrono-
logical considerations: this particular topic does not appear in the early works 
such as Elements and De cive, but surfaces only in Leviathan, which was written 
during the Parisian sojourn in close connection with the circles we have de-
scribed above, and in which the libertine component was both significant and 
provocative. Secondly, doctrinal considerations: both Hobbes and the French 
libertines read Machiavelli in a similar way.
Indeed, neither Hobbes nor the two French writers gave much importance 
to the “civic” and “republican” virtues for which religion had been a support as 
with the Romans, according to Machiavelli’s interpretation in the Discorsi so-
pra la prima deca di Tito Livio. Unlike the Florentine writer, these authors of the 
seventeenth century did not reproach Christianity for having stifled warrior 
virtues and discouraged the political participation of citizens in favor of such 
false virtues as humility and poverty; instead, they accused it of having fed 
rebellion against authority under the pretext of religion. Consequently, nei-
ther Hobbes nor the French Libertines encouraged the active participation of 
citizens in public affairs in the spirit of republican liberty, as Machiavelli would 
have wished. On the contrary, they advocated submission to authority. What 
really interested them was respect for laws within the frame of an exchange of 
protection for obedience; this exchange takes place without political participa-
tion in the “republican” sense that drove Machiavelli to value the religion of the 
ancients more highly that of the moderns.
All things considered, Hobbes, quite as much as Naudé and La Mothe Le 
Vayer, prefers passive submission to authority, even to the point of political in-
difference, over the patriotism advocated by Machiavelli, if this patriotism is to 
become the seed of rebellion and civil war. A reading of a key passage from the 
dialogue on politics (De la politique) by La Mothe Le Vayer suffices to see this 
foundational exchange of obedience and protection, which is also the basis of 
the political theory of Leviathan, at work in the libertine theory of the state: 
“Even if kings are above the laws of Tribonian, they still have those of reason 
to stand above them. If their subjects owe them obedience, they are account-
able to the subjects for protection.“55 And, we should also add that we find in 
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 classique. Regards sur la pensée politique de la France dans le second XVIIe siècle ed. by 
Henri Méchoulan and Joël Cornette (Paris: Vrin, 1996), pp. 71–92.
56 See La Mothe Le Vayer, “De la divinité,” Dialogues, pp. 334 and 332. For praise of the Ro-
mans for their tolerance, see Leviathan, p. 178.
57 See Leviathan, xi, p. 162.
the dialogue On Divinity by La Mothe both the phrase “natural religion,” which 
was not so common at the time, as well as praise for the tolerance of religions 
instituted by the Romans, that very tolerance which Hobbes himself valued in 
Leviathan, again within the framework of the political use of religious beliefs 
by the ancient legislators.56
We can thus assert that, in the successive transitions of Leviathan’s dis-
course, from a “curious” religion to anxiety and ignorance, from the cultivation 
of “natural seeds,” to their political exploitation, Hobbes made his way to one 
of the most characteristic libertine doctrines, that of the politico-religious leg-
islators who put into motion the basic affects, namely, hope and especially fear, 
and manipulated beliefs in order to establish and consolidate their power over 
human society. The phrase of Hobbes with which he illustrates “the designs 
of the authors of the religion of the pagans” could have been written by a La 
Mothe or a Naudé:
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those 
that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and 
forme it into Laws; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion 
of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be 
able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their 
Powers.57
Sometimes, among the Libertines, the issue is the particular interests of the 
leaders, but, most of the time, the aim is, as Naudé says, “the consideration of 
the good and utility of the public, which often prevails over that of individuals.“ 
Above all, the main aim is the control of the people, who are always described 
as a constant threat to the tranquility and security of the state. This aim li-
censes the use of lies and “impostures,” even of “coups d’état,” as in, according 
to Naudé, the famous example of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, pro-
vided they serve to maintain authority and therefore peace. These legislators 
do not create the passions on which they bring pressure to bear, but it is certain 
that they manipulate beliefs derived from the passions to serve to legitimize or 
strengthen their authority and to ensure peace of the state.
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58 See Leviathan, p. 178.
59 See Leviathan pp. 178–180:
And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known 
world, made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself, 
unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their civil government; nor do we 
read, that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who (being the peculiar 
Even if he knows and takes up the libertine discourse without mentioning 
his sources, Hobbes elaborates a more “moderate” version of this libertine art of 
government. Leviathan witnesses to a preference for emphasizing the strictly 
political functionality of the myths invented by legislators. The religious myth 
is more a necessity for the social cohesion which power seeks than the effect of 
exploitation dictated by the personal interests of those who govern. Even con-
cerning the “religion of the Gentiles,” Hobbes clearly states that it was “a part 
of their policy.”58 It is only in this perspective that the products which teem in 
human imagination find a kind of coherence when they are directed toward 
rational ends, namely, peace and obedience. Hobbes admires with the French 
Libertines the exceptional flourishing of human imagination and passions in 
the realm of “superstition.” His own skepticism towards this mythopoiesis is 
not that different from that of a major skeptic, like La Mothe Le Vayer; how-
ever, Hobbes overall stresses the political function of these religious myths, 
following in the steps of a political thinker like Naudé.
8 Hobbes’s Contractarianism and French Libertinism
It thus appears undeniable that the Libertines’ discourse had some impact on 
Hobbes. He learned from the French Libertines to treat both religion in general 
and pagan religion in particular as phenomena closely tied on the one hand to 
human psychology and to the requirements of politics on the other. As we have 
seen, biblical religion remains out of the picture, or it re-enters only partially, 
namely, to the extent that even “divine politics” is a form of politics that shares 
with “human politics” some general requirements inherent to any type of gov-
ernment over people. Yet, for Hobbes, the distinction between the two remains 
quite firm. While “the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy,” in the 
“kingdom of God,” it is He himself that, “by supernaturall Revelation, planted 
Religion,” “made to himself a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes.” Thus, in this 
case, “the Policy, and Laws Civill, are a part of Religion,”59 and not the other 
way round like in “human politics.”
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kingdom of God) thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king 
or state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of 
their policy.
 But where God himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion; there he also 
made to himself a peculiar kingdom; and gave laws, not only of behaviour towards 
himself, but also towards one another; and thereby in the kingdom of God, the policy, 
and laws civil, are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal, and 
spiritual domination, hath there no place.
60 See A.L. Schino, “La fine del mito del legislatore: la trasformazione delle figure di Mosé e 
di Cristo a metà del xvii secolo,” Annali di Storia dell’Esegesi 32 (2015), pp. 509–524, see 
especially p. 509.
61 See Naudé, Considérations politiques, p. 182. In the Apologie, Naudé attributes to Christ 
the use of a “divine magic” with which some legislators have accomplished their miracles, 
while the other legislators have simply used a “natural magic,” which is the equivalent 
of an occult physics and has in it nothing of the supernatural. See Naudé, Apologie, pp. 
21–45.
The impact of learned libertinism on Hobbes may be calculated in terms 
not only of reception but also of reaction. Knowledge of the libertine theo-
ries of Naudé and of La Mothe Le Vayer served Hobbes in elaborating a fuller 
concept of religion, even to the point of understanding “natural religion” and 
paganism in this broader framework, but it also led him to take a clear posi-
tion against the assimilation between Moses and the “ancient legislators,” on 
whom the Libertines had principally exercised themselves. The reasons for this 
demarcation are not only religious but also political.
 Religious Reasons
Albeit in ambiguous and veiled ways, the French Libertines had seen the pos-
sibility of extending the model of the politico-religious legislator to include 
Moses and, to some extent, even Christ. In the Considérations politiques of 
Naudé, Moses, as Schino says,60 “is not a prophet but an astute politician, the 
first legislator of the Jewish people and the founder of a kingdom;” his name 
completes a long list of “ancient legislators,” who made use of religion to “con-
fer authority, strengthen and firmly establish their laws.” It was for this reason 
that they “made the people believe that they had received these laws from a 
deity.” The list begins with Zoroaster, includes Mohammed and ends with Mo-
ses, even while Naudé tells us: “he was the wisest, and Exodus tells us how he 
received his law directly from God.”61
With respect to Moses, the Hobbesian position is very different: not only 
was he not a “magician,” or a “divine magician,” as claimed by Naudé; he was 
not even a “legislator” in the strict sense. Already in the first work written in 
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62 See De cive, xvi, 10, p. 239.
63 See De cive, xvii, 4, p. 252.
64 See De cive, xvii, 6, p. 255.
65 See Leviathan, xxxii, vol. iii, p. 582.
66 See Leviathan, xli, p. 768.
67 On the differences between Hobbes and the Libertines, see Schino, art. cit., pp. 518–524.
France, De cive, it is clear that Moses was only an “interpreter of the laws and 
of the word [of God],”62 not the author himself of the laws, which were instead 
given to him by God. The same “kingdom” in the old covenant belonged to 
God, based on a contract between Him and the people. Like that of Moses, 
the office of Christ also was not “royal,” but only “vice-regal” in that the king-
dom belonged to the Father.63 A parallel between Moses and Christ applies 
also with respect to the laws: the former in that he had them from the Father, 
whereas the latter did not bring a new law but “passed [on] and promulgated 
the Father’s laws.”64 Christ will be king only until after the final resurrection, 
at the time of His second coming. With some slight variation, this pattern is 
maintained and strengthened in Leviathan: Moses is more a “sovereign proph-
et” than a real and true legislator; he is not the author of the commandments 
but has only the function “to declare God’s commandements to the people.”65 
God spoke directly with Moses, even if it is not quite clear how he did it; in ad-
dition, as is known, in Leviathan, Hobbes denies that Moses was the author of 
the Pentateuch. Then, as for the figure of Christ, Leviathan again accentuates 
His spiritual character so as to avoid any interference with the existing exercise 
of politico-religious sovereignty. To the three parts of his “office” (redeemer; 
pastor, counselor or teacher; king, king forever) correspond distinguishable 
temporal moments such that His function as king is exercised only after the fi-
nal resurrection; “the kingdom of God is not of this world,” as Hobbes does not 
cease to remind his readers. Thus, similar to Moses, not even Christ was sover-
eign legislator but rather a “subordinate or Viceregent of God the Father.”66 The 
profile which emerges of Moses and Christ, from De cive and even more by the 
time of Leviathan, no longer corresponds to that of the libertine “legislator,” as 
Schino has highlighted in her comparison between Naudé and Hobbes.67 To 
the contrary, one may even think that Hobbes has expressed not only his own 
personal conviction but a reaction to Libertines like Naudé. We must exclude 
the thought that, for Hobbes, unlike for Naudé, it is possible to include Moses, 
much less Christ, in the same sequence as includes Zoroaster, Minos, Lycurgus 
or Mohammed.
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68 See Naudé, Considérations politiques, pp. 94 and 132–133. See also our “Hobbes and the 
French Skeptics,” cited above, footnote 41, pp. 72–76 (“Hobbes’s Response to the Challenge 
of Political Skepticism”).
69 This judgment (is found in a letter of June 27 of 1642, addressed to Cardinal Barberini, 
in which Naudé notifies the cardinal of the publication of De cive, which he has just re-
ceived. The letter was found and first published by Anna Lisa Schino, “Tre lettere inedite 
di Gabriel Naudé,” Rivista di storia della filosofia 4 (1987), p. 707. Naudé refers in particular 
to Hobbes’s thesis according to which the unum necessarium of faith is to believe that 
Jesus is the Christ.
 Political Reasons
Yet, political reasons also explain the reaction of Hobbes. They pertain to a 
different conception of the role which the contract plays in the establishment 
of the state, including that particular state which was the Jewish theocracy, 
from Abraham up to the kings of Israel. The conception of Naudé, focused on 
the idea of the “coup d’état,” left no room for a contractual foundation of sov-
ereign power, based on the voluntary and rational consent of citizens. Such a 
foundation would be incomprehensible for the French Libertines. Taking es-
pecially from Montaigne certain ironic and skeptical considerations as to the 
“mystical foundations” of political authority (those that are mysterious and 
unutterable), and deepening them, Naudé considered that he had revealed the 
“arcana imperiorum” upon which rests sovereign authority, which is not based 
on the consent of the subjects, but on imposture, above all, religious impos-
ture, on violence, on bullying, most often on “barbarism and cruelty.” These 
are, for him, “the beginnings of all monarchies.”68 Nothing is further from the 
contractarian approach of Hobbes, and in fact the idea of the social contract 
remains foreign to all of the political thought of the French Libertines. The 
“legislator” of Naudé, again, with Moses as no exception, has the traits of the 
crudest Machiavellianism, consisting in resort to fraud and violence, without a 
thought for the possibility of a political pact. Rights, equality, contract – that is, 
the foundations of Hobbes’s thought – could only have appeared to Naudé as 
“new opinions, daring and such as to tidy up put weak brains,” (“opinioni nove, 
ardite e da mettere i cervelli deboli a partito”) as he wrote to Cardinal Barberini 
in commenting on the De cive. Still referring to Hobbes’s book, he would warn: 
“if the book were widely known, there would be no lack to the great confusion 
it would wreak” (“se il libro fusse commune non mancherebbe di recare gran 
confusione”).69 Even if Naudé appreciates the novelty of Hobbes’s theses, his 
judgment remains reserved and not favorable at all.
Therefore, even from the political point of view, the profile of the Hobbes-
ian sovereign is different from the libertine “legislator.” According to the author 
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70 See Leviathan, xxxv, p. 636.
71 On this point, see Schino, art. cit.
72 On the Humanist legacy in general and Lorenzo Valla in particular, see our “Thomas 
Hobbes e Lorenzo Valla. Critica umanistica e filosofia moderna,” Rinascimento, 39 (1999), 
pp. 515–568; “Hobbes, Valla and the Trinity,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 
11 (2003), pp. 183–218; “Hobbes’s Critique of the Doctrine of Essences and Its Sources,” 
The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. by P. Springborg (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007), pp. 337–357; “Hobbes e Valla. Teologia, linguaggio e riforma 
della filosofia prima,” La diffusione europea del pensiero del Valla, ed. by Mariangela Rego-
liosi and Clementina Marsico, Atti del Comitato Nazionale vi Centenario della nascita di 
Lorenzo Valla (Florence: Edizioni Polistampa, 2013), book i, pp. 327–344; “Thomas Hobbes 
and the Aristotelian account of the Virtues and His Renaissance Source Lorenzo Valla,” 
of Leviathan, contractarianism applies also to theocracy. After the phase of the 
natural realm, based on divine omnipotence, even God rules as a king over 
the Jews by means of a “pact,” first, with Abraham and, then, through Moses, 
with the people at the foot of the Mount Sinai. One deals here with a real “civil 
sovereignty,” for which the consent of the people is needed.70 In this theocratic 
stage, Moses is only the interpreter of God’s laws and His prophet. Even “God’s 
kingdom,” as it is described in the Ancient Testament and interpreted in Levia-
than, conforms to the general pattern of political covenant on which Hobbes’s 
theory of sovereignty rests.
9 Conclusion: Demystification and Constructive Politics
Can we then maintain that the philosophy of Hobbes signals the end of the 
“myth of the legislator”71 and, in consequence, the end of the libertine analysis 
of politics? The answer is “yes” to the first part of the question and “no” to the 
second. It is certain that, within the sphere of constructive political propos-
als, Hobbes’s contractarianism ushered in a new era which one may define as 
“political idealism” insofar as the contractual model is an abstract model based 
upon assumptions that are no less abstract: equality, rights, state of nature, 
etc. This position may be contrasted with “political realism,” which was main-
tained by Libertines and skeptics regarding the origins and exercise of power.
On the other hand, with respect to the political analysis of existing regimes 
and their “ideological” underpinnings, as we would term them today, important 
aspects of libertine analysis are not only retained in the thought of Hobbes but 
continue their function, often in direct continuity with the legacy of humanis-
tic criticism, especially that enunciated by Valla.72 This is certainly true for the 
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(Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), pp. 220–237.
73 See Leviathan, xliv, p. 956. Of course, in the fourth part of Leviathan, Hobbes draws abun-
dantly from Protestant criticism of Scholasticism and of the Roman Catholic Church. The 
relationship is yet to be studied between this kind of criticism and libertine criticism, 
which instead was generally averse to Protestantism or considered it only from a political 
standpoint. In the light of the connections we have studied here, Hobbes is perhaps the 
most prominent link between these two kinds of criticism. On the Protestant contribu-
tion, see A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan. Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Poli-
tics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and then G. Wright, Religion, Politics 
and Thomas Hobbes, pp. 15–32.
74 I am very grateful to George Wright for his translation. I wish also to thank the anonymous 
reviewers and especially the reviewer 1; his remarks helped me to clarify one important 
point of my argument. This research is original and has been funded by the Università del 
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study of the past, as in Hobbes’s analysis of the relationship between power 
and the “religion of the Gentiles,” as we have seen, but also for the disenchant-
ment of the present, as in his theory of religion in general, for which Hobbes 
was an imposing leading figure. One revealing indicator of this among others 
is his recourse to techniques of demystification of “imposture,” as these had 
been developed by the Libertines and then taken up by Hobbes in at least three 
crucial areas: the analysis of signs and miracles, the description of human cre-
dulity and the dismantling of the “Confederacy of Deceivers,” (“Impostorum 
confoederatio”)73 on which rests the “kingdom of darkness.” The birth of a new 
political paradigm which would rebuild the state on new foundations did not 
preclude that another paradigm such as French Libertinism, might still be use-
ful for the demystification both of the past and of the present.74
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